Squeezing Cyberspace into International Shoe: When Should Courts Exercise Personal Jurisdiction over Noncommercial Online Speech by Neikirk, Katherine
Volume 45 Issue 2 Article 5 
2000 
Squeezing Cyberspace into International Shoe: When Should 
Courts Exercise Personal Jurisdiction over Noncommercial Online 
Speech 
Katherine Neikirk 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the Computer Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Katherine Neikirk, Squeezing Cyberspace into International Shoe: When Should Courts Exercise Personal 
Jurisdiction over Noncommercial Online Speech, 45 Vill. L. Rev. 353 (2000). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol45/iss2/5 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova 
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
2000]
SQUEEZING CYBERSPACE INTO INTERNATIONAL SHOE:
WHEN SHOULD COURTS EXERCISE PERSONAL JURISDICTION
OVER NONCOMMERCIAL ONLINE SPEECH?
The advent, evolution and growth of the Internet is, I think, one of the
most fascinating and unprecedented human achievements of the cen-
tury .... It's really something new, it's a new kind of civilization. And
of course the thing I love about it is that it's transnational, non-profit-it
isn't owned by anyone-and its shape is completely user driven. What it
is, is determined by the needs of millions and millions of users.1
I. INTRODUCTION
As the century closes, we are entering a new digital age.2 Our lives are
changing as more and more people go online.3 It is now possible to buy
groceries, visit a doctor, date or place a bet on the Internet.
4
1. Interview by Dan Josefsson with William Gibson (Nov. 23, 1994) <http://
www.josefsson.net/gibson/gibson2.html>. Science fiction author William Gibson
is credited with coining the term "cyberspace." See Bruce Headlam, Walkman
Sounded Bell for Cyberspace, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1999, at G7. In his 1984 novel
Neuromancer, Gibson envisioned an online culture that he called "cyberspace." See
id. (describing origins of term).
2. For a further discussion of developments on the Internet, see infra notes 3-
8 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., The Dawn of E-Life, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 20, 1999, at 3841 (discussing
impact of Internet on our lives). According to this article, 196 million people will
use the Internet in 1999 and more than 500 million people will use the Internet by
2003. See id. at 41 (projecting growth of Internet use).
4. See, e.g., Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Found., 958 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1996)
(noting that Internet users may browse football scores, listen to music or look at
law school classes). In online auctions, people can purchase anything from plane
tickets to watches. See Robert D. Hof, Going Going Gone, Bus. WK., Apr. 12, 1999,
at 30 [hereinafter Hof, Going] (discussing growth in online auctions). Over three
million people purchased something from online auctions in 1998 and this
number is expected to grow to 14 million by 2003. See id. People are also using
the Internet to manage their own investments through discount brokerages, buy
groceries, Christmas shop and download IRS forms. See Robert D. Hof, The 'Click-
Here'Economy, Bus. WK.,June 22, 1998, at 122 [hereinafter Hof, Click-Here] (exam-
ining various online commercial activities); Glenn Ruffenach, Jumping Online,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 1999, at 6 (describing range of services and activities that
Internet offers).
Using the Internet to obtain healthcare information, fill prescriptions and
consult with doctors has become increasingly popular. See Marilyn Chase, Calling
on Doctors in Cyberspace (Bring Your Own Magazine), WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 1999, at B6
(discussing online medical information options); Erika Check, Doctors Go Dot. Com,
NEWSWEEK, Aug. 16, 1999, at 65 (stating that 25 million patients went online for
medical information in 1998 and 33 million are expected to go online by end of
2000). But see Let the Surfer Beware, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 16, 1998, at 90 (warning that
online healthcare information is "sketchy" at best).
(353)
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Although most media attention centers on commercial online activity,
the Internet is primarily a way for people to communicate about personal,
rather than commercial, interests.5 People can find advice on raising their
children or tracing their family trees online. 6 The Internet provides a way
for people with common interests to discuss almost anything from Buffy the
Vampire Slayer to Marxism on listservs, Usenet discussion groups and chat
rooms. 7 The Internet has also encouraged political activism; Serbians
have used email to draw attention to atrocities in Yugoslavia and Chinese
dissidents have used the Internet to promote democracy. 8
Because the Internet has touched almost every aspect of our daily
lives, it is not surprising that these changes have spread to the legal world. 9
As online activity increases, so do Internet-based crimes such as fraud,
hacking, pornography, trademark infringement and defamation. 10 Due
5. See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 842 (E.D. Pa. 1996) ("The In-
ternet is not exclusively, or even primarily, a means of commercial communica-
tion."), affd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). In ACLU, the court finally characterized the
Internet as a "never-ending worldwide conversation." Id. at 883. Other commenta-
tors have also remarked on how the Internet brings people together. See, e.g., Jill
Smolowe, Intimate Strangers, TIME, Spring 1995, at 20 (stating that "the vast majority
of people who troll the Internet's byways are there in search of social interaction").
Through the Internet, people may form lifelong friendships or fall in love. See id.
The Internet also allows older people to stay connected. See Dale D. Bass, Email:
Restoring the Village, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 1999, at 7 (recognizing that Internet
facilitates grandparents staying in touch with grandchildren and friends).
6. See, e.g., Barbara Kantrowitz, Modem-moms, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 16, 1996, at 72
(looking at Web sites that provide information on child rearing, health and nutri-
tion); Marc Peyser & Claudia Kalb, Roots Network: Millions of Americans Seek Their
Ancestors in Record Books, Cemeteries and Cyberspace, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 24, 1997, at 32
(noting that people are using Usenet groups and Web sites to track down their
ancestors).
7. See, e.g., ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 842 (calling content of Internet "as diverse
as human thought"); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication
Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1366 n.4 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (describing Usenet traf-
fic). For a further discussion of listservs and Usenet groups, see infra note 46 and
accompanying text.
8. SeeJulian Dibbell, Emailfrom Belgrade, TIME, Mar./Apr. 1997, at 56 (examin-
ing how Serbians used Internet to protest against President Milosevic). Due to the
decentralized nature of the Internet, it is difficult for governments to censor how
their citizens use it. See id. (noting technological difficulties in government control
of Internet); see alsoJaime A. Florcruz, Downloading Dissent, TIME, Nov. 9, 1998, at
25 (discussing Chinese dissidents' use of Web sites and mailing lists to promote
democracy).
9. For a discussion of how the Internet has affected people's lives and the
legal community, see supra notes 3-8, and infra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
10. See Weber v.Jolly Hotels, 977 F. Supp. 327, 333 (D.N.J. 1997) ("Litigation
involving the Internet has increased as the Internet has developed and ex-
panded."); Blakey v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 730 A.2d 854, 863 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1999) (noting "proliferation" in Internet cases since growth of Internet's
popularity); Steven Betensky, Jurisdiction and the Internet, 19 PACE L. REV. 1, 2-5
(1998) (discussing large number of cases involving personal jurisdiction on In-
ternet). Betensky speculates that there are several possible explanations for these
cases. See id. at 2 (explaining increase in Internet personal jurisdiction cases).
First, he suggests that the popularity of the Internet has offered plaintiffs a new way
[Vol. 45: p. 353
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to the rise in Internet-based cases, courts must apply traditional principles
such as personal jurisdiction to the newest of technologies." It is unclear,
however, whether personal jurisdiction principles derived from notions of
state sovereignty and territorial limits can apply neatly to technology with
no geographical boundaries or physical presence. 12 The United States
of obtaining jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. See id. Second, Betensky
argues that the number of Internet-jurisdiction cases is a result of all the harm that
the Internet has caused. See id. at 2-3. Because of the technology, it is easy to
inflict harm through the Internet. See id. Other commentators have also re-
marked on the increase in Internet-related cases. See LANCE ROSE, NETLAW: YOUR
RIGHTS IN THE ONLINE WORLD XV-Xvi (1995) (recognizing that growth of Internet
activity has led to increase in Internet conflicts). As Rose points out, many compa-
nies have invested a great deal of time and money in the Internet and are willing to
protect those investments. See id. at xvi. Also, courts are influenced by all the
media hype about the Internet. See id. (claiming that judges notice media
attention).
Internet cases cover a wide variety of legal issues including trademark infringe-
ment, cybersquatting, electronic contract disputes, privacy, hacking, pornography
and computer viruses. See id. at 187-208 (providing overview of Internet crime);
JONATHAN ROSENOR, CYBERLAW: THE LAw OF THE INTERNET 167-226 (1997) (dis-
cussing Internet crimes).
11. SeeEdbergv. Neogen Corp., 17F. Supp. 2d 104, 113 (D. Conn. 1998) ("As
the Internet has experienced nearly exponential growth over the past few years, its
impact on conventional notions of personal jurisdiction has been hotly debated in
courts throughout the country and in countless law review articles and treatises.");
Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41 VILL. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1996) ("Con-
ventional doctrines ofjurisdiction to prescribe, to adjudicate and to enforce legal
decisions must evolve to handle new disputes in cyberspace."); Christopher E.
Friel, Comment, Downloading a Defendant: Is Categorizing Internet Contacts a Departure
from the Minimum Contacts Test?, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 293, 303 (1998) (call-
ing personal jurisdiction "most important procedural issue in regards to Internet
cases"); John A. Lowther IV, Comment, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet Quag-
mire: AmputatingJudicially Created Long-Arms, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 619, 653 (1998)
("Our ancient and outdated notions of geography, territory, and presence have
finally met their match against an entity that has no geography, is not confined to
any one territory, and gives everyone an instant presence everywhere."); Jason H.
Eaton, Effect of Use, or Alleged Use, of Internet on Personal Jurisdiction in, or Venue of
Federal Court Case, 155 A.L.R. FED. 535, 535 (1999) ("The explosive rise of the In-
ternet as a communications medium has had tremendous implications for courts
faced with the application of personal jurisdiction doctrines.").
12. See, e.g., Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 48 n.7 (D.D.C. 1998)
(stating "'cyberspace' is not 'space' at all. At least not in the way we understand
space. It's not located anywhere; it has no boundaries; you can't 'go' there. At the
bottom, the Internet is really more idea than entity."); Digital Equip. Corp. v. Al-
taVista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 462 (D. Mass. 1997) ("To paraphrase Ger-
trude Stein, as far as the Internet is concerned, not only is there perhaps 'no there
there,' the 'there' is everywhere where there is Internet access."); ACLU, 929 F.
Supp. at 830 ("The Internet is not a physical or tangible entity."); Allan R. Stein,
The Unexceptional Problem of Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, '32 INT'L LAw. 1167, 1173
(1998) (remarking that "place in cyberspace has been reduced to a mere meta-
phor"). As one commentator described the Internet:
I . . .start thinking about this thing that buzzes around the entire
world, through the phone lines, all day and all night long. It's right
under our noses, and it's invisible. It's like Narnia, or Magritte, or Star
2000] NOTE
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District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently confronted
this issue in Barrett v. Catacombs Press.1 3
This Note discusses the process of applying traditional personal juris-
diction principles to the Internet.14 Part II summarizes the history of per-
sonal jurisdiction and how courts have applied these concepts to cases
involving the Internet.' 5 Part III presents the facts of Barrett.16 Part IV
analyzes and critiques the reasoning of the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Barrett.17 Finally, Part V examines
Barrett's possible impact on noncommercial, Internet cases. 18
II. BACKGROUND
A. State Long-Arm Statute Requirements
Federal courts rely on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to estab-
lish personal jurisdiction. 19 First, a federal court must examine the long-
arm statute of the state it sits in to decide if the exercise of personal juris-
diction would be proper.20 If a case does not meet the requirements of
the state long-arm statute, then the court cannot exercise personal juris-
Trek, an entire goddamned world. Except it doesn't physically exist. It's
just the collective consciousness of however many people are on it.
J.C. HERZ, SURFING ON THE INTERNET 3 (1995).
13. 44 F. Supp. 2d 717 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
14. For a discussion of the application of personal jurisdiction principles to
the Internet, see supra notes 1-13, and infra notes 15-182 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of personal jurisdiction and the Internet, see infra notes
19-77 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the facts of Barrett, see infra notes 78-90 and accompa-
nying text.
17. For a discussion of the district court's analysis in Barrett, see infra notes 91-
182 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of Barrett's possible impact on noncommercial Internet
cases, see infra notes 183-93 and accompanying text.
19. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e) (1) (authorizing service upon individual in any
judicial district "pursuant to the law of the state in which the district court is lo-
cated, or in which service is effected, for the service of a summons upon the de-
fendant in an action brought in the courts of general jurisdiction of the State").
Service of summons will establish personal jurisdiction over the defendant "who
would be subjected to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state
in which the district court is located . . ." FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k) (1) (A).
20. See FED. R. Cxv. P. 4(e)(1) (authorizing courts to exercise personal juris-
diction pursuant to state long-arm statute); Provident Nat'l Bank v. California Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 819 F.2d 434, 436 (3d Cir. 1987) (noting that state long-arm
statutes determine applicability of personal jurisdiction). Many state long-arm stat-
utes extend personal jurisdiction to the limits of the United States Constitution.
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 164-101(B) (Michie 1997) (extending personal jurisdic-
tion to limits of United States Constitution); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West
1999) (same); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-209(c) (West 1999) (same); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5322(b) (West 1998) (same). A few states, however, do not extend
personal jurisdiction to the limits of the Constitution. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302a
(McKinney 1999) (limiting exercise of personal jurisdiction with four factors).
[Vol. 45: p. 353
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diction.2 1 If the case does fall within the state long-arm statute, then the
court must determine whether exercising personal jurisdiction is proper
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
22
The Supreme Court of the United States has distinguished between
general and specific personal jurisdiction.2 3 General jurisdiction occurs
"when the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to the foreign
[defendant's] activities in the forum."24 For a court to exercise general
jurisdiction, the defendant must have had "continuous and systematic"
contacts with the forum state.2 5 When the cause of action arises directly
from or relates to the nonresident defendant's contacts with the forum,
then specific jurisdiction is proper. 26
B. Due Process Limitations on Personal Jurisdiction
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits a state's
power to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.27
Based on the Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court has ruled that per-
sonal jurisdiction is proper if a defendant has "certain minimum contacts
21. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1) (requiring courts to comply with applica-
ble state long-arm statutes in order to exercise personal jurisdiction).
22. See, e.g., Barrett v. Catacombs Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717, 723 (E.D. Pa.
1999) (describing two-step analysis that federal courts must engage in when decid-
ing whether personal jurisdiction is proper); Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King,
937 F. Supp. 295, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (recognizing that even if personal jurisdic-
tion was proper under New York Long-Arm statute it must also comply with due
process), affd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).
23. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-19
(1984) (using different standards to determine whether case fell under specific or
general jurisdiction).
24. Id. at 414.
25. Id. at 415-16. In Helicopteros, the Court found that the defendant's con-
tacts with Texas were not "continuous and systematic" enough to justify general
jurisdiction. See id. at 416. The defendant had sent its CEO to Texas for one nego-
tiation session, accepted checks drawn on a Texas bank, bought equipment in and
sent pilots to Texas for training. See id. (describing defendant's contacts with
Texas). Plaintiffs generally have had difficulty proving that defendants' forum
contacts satisfied the systematic and continuous standard of general jurisdiction.
See Surgical Laser Techs., Inc. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 281, 284 (E.D. Pa.
1996) (stating that Helicopteros illustrates difficulty of satisfying continuous and sys-
tematic standard).
26. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (describing
specific jurisdiction); Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 (defining specific jurisdiction).
To decide whether a cause of action arose from the defendant's forum activities, a
court must examine the "relationship [between] the defendant, the forum, and
the litigation." Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977).
27. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877) (holding that states have
sovereignty and exclusive jurisdiction over people within their territory but cannot
exercise these powers over people outside their territory); see also Helicopteros, 466
U.S. at 413-14 (noting purpose of Due Process Clause); Kulko v. Superior Court,
436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978) ("The Due Process Clause ... operates as a limitation on
the jurisdiction of state courts to enter judgments affecting rights or interest of
nonresident defendants.").
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with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not of-
fend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' '2 8 In decid-
ing whether it can exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant, a court must analyze: (1) whether the defendant has sufficient
minimum contacts with the forum; (2) and if there are sufficient mini-
mum contacts, whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports
with "fair play and substantial justice."29
1. Minimum Contacts
To conclude that a defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with
the forum, a court must find that the defendant could "reasonably antici-
pate being haled into court there." 30 A defendant can anticipate being
28. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). In International Shoe, the Supreme
Court affirmed the Supreme Court of Washington's ruling that personal jurisdic-
tion was proper. See id. at 320-22. The defendant had employed 11 to 13 salespe-
ople to sell shoes in Washington. See id. at 313-14. The salespeople showed
samples, took orders and transmitted these orders to the defendant's headquarters
in Missouri. See id. (detailing job duties of salespeople). The shoes were then
shipped into Washington from Missouri. See id. at 314. The state of Washington
sued the defendant to collect overdue contributions to a state unemployment
fund. See id. at 311-12. The Supreme Court found that the defendant had "system-
atic and continuous" contacts with Washington. See id. at 320 (finding defendant's
contacts "were neither irregular nor casual"). Because the defendant had exer-
cised the privilege of conducting business within Washington, it was also bound by
the obligations of acting in that state (namely making payments to unemployment
fund). See id. at 319-20. Therefore, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the
defendant was proper. See id. at 321.
29. Id. at 320.
30. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); see
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984) (holding that California could exer-
cise personal jurisdiction over National Inquirer editor and writer because defend-
ants could have anticipated being haled into court in California, defendants wrote
article causing harm in forum and newspaper had largest circulation there); Kee-
ton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 (1984) (deciding personal jurisdic-
tion in New Hampshire was proper because defendant had "continuously and
deliberately exploited" forum market and could have reasonably anticipated being
haled into forum court for libel). But see Kulko, 436 U.S. at 97-98 (refusing to allow
California personal jurisdiction over nonresident father who had allowed his chil-
dren to move to California because father could not have anticipated being haled
into California court); Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 216 (finding personal jurisdiction in
Delaware was improper because defendants could not have reasonably expected to
be haled into Delaware court system).
The "reasonably anticipate being haled into court" standard is stronger than
mere foreseeability of injury. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474. World-Wide Volk-
swagen established that foreseeability alone is not enough for jurisdiction. See
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295-99 (rejecting plaintiffs argument that per-
sonal jurisdiction was proper in Oklahoma just because it was foreseeable that car
could cause injury there). In that case, it was foreseeable that the defendants' car
could end up in a car accident in Oklahoma. See id. at 295. It was also foreseeable
that a divorced wife would live in California and that her daughter would move
there to be with her, but the Supreme Court refused to find California had per-
sonal jurisdiction over the ex-husband who lived in New York. See id. at 296. In
[Vol. 45: p. 353
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haled into a forum state's court if it has "purposefully avail [ed] itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the
benefits and protections of its laws." 3' The Supreme Court has found pur-
poseful availment when a defendant entered into a contract and negotia-
tions in the forum state, 32 sold magazines across the nation including the
forum state33 and maintained a sales force in the forum state. 34 It is un-
clear whether entering a product into the stream of commerce subjects a
defendant to personal jurisdiction. 3 5
In cases involving tortious conduct, the Supremne Court has formu-
lated an "effects test" to determine whether the forum state can exercise
World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court refused to exercise personal jurisdiction over the
retailer and wholesaler because they had not purposefully availed themselves of
conducting business in Oklahoma; it was a "fortuitous circumstance" that the car
was involved in an accident in Oklahoma, Id. at 295.
31. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). As the Court pointed out in
Burger King, requiring purposeful availment "ensures that a defendant will not be
haled into ajurisdiction solely as a result of 'random,' 'fortuitous,' or 'attenuated,'
contacts." Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 (quoting Keeton, 465 U.S. at 774).
32. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 478-82 (holding defendant was subject to per-
sonal jurisdiction in Florida because he had negotiated and entered into contract
containing Florida choice-of-law provision).
33. See Keeton, 465 U.S. at 73-74 (holding defendant's "regular circulation of
magazines in the forum State is sufficient to support an assertion ofjurisdiction in
a libel action based on the contents of the magazine").
34. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320-22 (concluding defendant's business
activities in Washington were sufficient for personal jurisdiction). For a further
discussion of International Shoe, see supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
35. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 108-13 (1987)
(plurality opinion) (addressing stream of commerce theory). In Asahi, the peti-
tioner was a Japanese manufacturer of tire valve assemblies. See id. at 106. These
valve assemblies were sold to a number of companies including Cheng Shin, a
Taiwanese corporation, which used these assemblies in tires shipped all over the
world. See id. After Cheng Shin was sued in California for damages relating to the
blowout of a tire, Cheng Shin attempted to indemnify Asahi. See id. The Califor-
nia Supreme Court found personal jurisdiction over Asahi was proper because the
company was aware that its valve assemblies could end up in California. See id. at
108. The Supreme Court reversed, however, finding California could not exercise
personal jurisdiction over Asahi. See id.
Although all of the Justices agreed that the exercise of personal jurisdiction in
California was improper under the reasonableness prong of the International Shoe
test, the Justices were split on whether Asahi had sufficient minimum contacts with
California. See id. at 105 (giving breakdown of votes). Justice O'Connor, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice Powell and Justice Scalia found that Asahi's "placement
of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the
defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State." Id. at 112. Justices
Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, however, concluded that Asahi had pur-
posefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in California. See id.
at 116-21. Finally, Justice Stevens believed it was unnecessary to consider the
stream of commerce theory because the exercise of personal jurisdiction was un-
reasonable. See id. at 121-22 (stating that minimum contacts analysis was unneces-
sary and even if required there were probably enough contacts to constitute
purposeful availment).
2000] NOTE
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personal jurisdiction. 36 Under the effects test, courts have exercised per-
sonal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants when the forum state was
the "focal point" of the plaintiffs injury.37 The Supreme Court held in
Calder v. Jones3 8 that California could exercise personal jurisdiction over
the defendants because "their intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions
were expressly aimed at California."3 9
2. Fair Play and Substantial Justice
Even if a defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum,
a court must look at whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would
be reasonable. 40 In deciding whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction
was reasonable, courts have considered the burden on the defendant, the
forum state's interest in protecting its residents, the plaintiffs interest in
obtaining convenient relief, the "interstate judicial system's interest in ob-
taining the most efficient resolution of controversies" and the states' inter-
est "in furthering substantive social policies."41 Lesser minimum contacts
may support personal jurisdiction if these factors are particularly strong. 42
36. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788-91 (1984) (discussing effects test).
In Calder, the National Inquirer had published an allegedly libelous story about en-
tertainer ShirleyJones. See id. at 784. The plaintiff sued the Florida-based publica-
tion in California. See id. The petitioners, an editor (who resided in Florida and
traveled frequently to California) and writer (who resided in Florida and prior to
the lawsuit had only visited California twice) moved to have the suit dismissed for
lack of personal jurisdiction. See id. at 784-86. The Supreme Court, however, held
that California could exercise personal jurisdiction over both defendants. See id. at
791. Because the plaintiff's career was based in California, she suffered most of the
damage from the defendants' story there. See id. at 789 (concluding California was
"focal point both of the story and of the harm suffered"). Furthermore, the de-
fendants used California sources to research and write the story. See id. Califor-
nia's exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendants was proper because
"their intentional conduct in Florida [was] calculated to cause injury... in Califor-
nia." Id. at 791. Because the defendants knew that the plaintiff would suffer most
of the harm in California, they could reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there. See id. at 789-90.
37. Id. at 789. The defendants were subject to personal jurisdiction in Califor-
nia because the plaintiff felt the effects of their conduct there. See id.
38. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
39. Id. at 789.
40. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (stating
that personal jurisdiction cannot violate fair play and substantial justice).
41. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980); see
also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (plurality
opinion) (setting forth factors to consider to decide whether exercise of personal
jurisdiction would be reasonable); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
476-77 (1985) (discussing reasonableness factors).
42. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477 (noting that strong factors in favor of
personal jurisdiction may compensate for lesser minimum contacts).
[Vol. 45: p. 353
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C. Personal Jurisdiction on the Internet
To comprehend the challenges of establishing personal jurisdiction
on the Internet, it is important to understand some basic Internet con-
cepts. 4 3 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania has described the Internet as a "giant network which
interconnects innumerable smaller groups of linked computer net-
works." 4 4 This "network of networks" has no central location or single
administrator. 45 Users can communicate and distribute information over
the Internet in a variety of ways including by email, Usenet discussion
groups, real time chat (Internet Relay Chat) and the World Wide Web.4 6
43. See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (noting
need for "clear understanding of... Internet" before reaching legal issues), affd,
521 U.S. 844 (1997).
44. Id. at 830. The decentralized structure of the Internet is a result of its
original purpose. See id. at 831 (discussing origins of Internet). In 1969 the Ad-
vanced Research Project Agency ("ARPA") created ARPANET, a network to con-
nect various military and university computers. See id. ARPANET was designed so
researchers and military personnel could continue to communicate even if war
damaged parts of the network. See id. Sent messages did not follow a single route
to their destination; instead a message could bounce through dozens of different
locations. See id. at 832. Nor is a single message transmitted in one piece. See id.
Messages are broken into packets and each packet may take a separate route to the
destination where all the packets are reassembled (this process is called packet
switching). See id. Thus, the end of a message may reach its destination before the
beginning. See id. In addition to ARPANET, other networks such as Usenet and
BITNET were created by universities and businesses. See id. Over time all these
individual networks linked together and today are known collectively as the In-
ternet. See id.
Individuals connect to the Internet through computers directly connected to
networks that are connected to the Internet or through a computer and modem
that connects by phone into a network that is connected to the Internet. See id.
With the necessary equipment, people may connect to the Internet at work, home,
school, stores and libraries. See id. at 832-33. Many people access the Internet
through commercial Internet Service Providers ("ISPs") such as America Online,
CompuServe and Erols. See id. at 833.
45. See id. at 832 (describing decentralized nature of Internet).
46. See id. at 834-38 (discussing methods of communicating on Internet).
Through email, a person can directly communicate with one or several people
with Internet access. See id. at 834.
Listservs are automatic mailing list services organized around particular topics
such as opera, children's literature or German. See id. at 834. To join a particular
listserv, a person must subscribe to that listserv by email. See id. After subscribing
to the listserv, a person will receive emails from other members of that listserv. See
id. To respond to an email, the recipient sends an email to the listerv which is
then automatically distributed to the other members (usually a computer does this
but some listservs are moderated by a person who will read and then only email
select messages). See id. Listservs that are run by computers are "open" and can be
joined automatically while closed listservs are run by human moderators who may
limit the number of subscribers. See id.
Like listservs, Usenet groups are organized around topics (such asjob oppor-
tunities in Delaware, Star Wars or tattoos). See id. at 834-35. Today there are about
45 thousand Usenet groups generating half a million postings a day. See Katie
Hafner, Old Newsgroups Marketed in New Packages, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1999, at GI
(giving Usenet statistics). As of 1995, approximately 20 people used Usenet. See id.
9
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1. Commercial Interactivity of Web Site
The general framework for analyzing personal jurisdiction on the In-
ternet was laid out in Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.4 7 Gen-
(stating last known number of Usenet participants). To access a particular Usenet
group, a person can subscribe to that group and read other subscriber's posts. See
ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 834-35 (providing information on joining Usenet group).
On moderated newsgroups a moderator, who decides which messages to post, re-
views all messages. See id. at 835. On unmoderated groups (the majority) posts are
automatically forwarded to all USENET servers that furnish access to the group.
See id. Unlike listserv messages, Usenet posts are not distributed to a person by
email. See id. Instead Usenet posts are disseminated to servers which temporarily
store these messages and periodically purge them. See id. So if a person wishes to
respond to somebody else's post or post his or her own messages, he or she will
post a message that is sent either to a moderator on a closed group or sent to other
servers on an open group. See id. Usenet groups are among the most open and
diverse methods of interaction on the Internet. See RoSE, supra note 10, at 24 (call-
ing Usenet discussion groups "loosely moderated anarchy"); Hafner, supra, at Gi
(calling Usenet "particularly untamed, free-flowing part of the Internet").
Internet users may also "chat" online. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 835 (provid-
ing overview of Internet chat). Through Internet Relay Chat ("IRC"), a person
may communicate with one or more people who are online at the same time. See
id. The user will type a message on his or her computer, which will be transmitted
and displayed on the recipient's computer. See id. ISPs such as America Online
and CompuServe have their own "chat" systems. See id.
People can also view and obtain information such as text, pictures, movies and
music from other computers. See id. at 835-36. Previously people used telnet or
file transfer protocol ("ftp") to access information on other computers. See id. at
835. Today, however, most people use the World Wide Web. See id. The Third
Circuit defined the World Wide Web as "a series of documents stored in different
computers all over the Internet." Id. at 836. World Wide Web pages are created
with hypertext markup language ("HTML") and then displayed on individual com-
puters through browsers such as Netscape and Microsoft Explorer using hypertext
transfer protocol ("http"). See id. at 836. Web pages can contain music, animation
and text. See id. Web pages also contain hypertext links that viewers can click on
to visit other Web sites or download information. See id. at 836-37. Although indi-
vidual computers may be incompatible, they can exchange information through
the World Wide Web. See id. at 838. The World Wide Web has become increas-
ingly popular because it is so easy to use. See id. at 837. Furthermore, HTML is so
simple and Web pages so cheap that it is fairly easy for non-technological people to
publish their own Web pages that are available to the entire world. See id.
47. 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997). In Zippo, the United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania found that the defendant was sub-
ject to personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania because it had sold approximately
three thousand passwords to Pennsylvania residents and entered into seven con-
tracts with Pennsylvania ISPs. See id. at 1125-26 (analyzing defendant's contacts
with forum). The Zippo court described the following framework for examining
personal jurisdiction on the Internet:
This sliding scale is consistent with well developed personal jurisdic-
tion principles. At one end of the spectrum are situations where a de-
fendant clearly does business over the Internet. If the defendant enters
into contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve the
knowing and repeated transmission of computer files over the Internet,
personal jurisdiction is proper. At the opposite end are situations where
a defendant has simply posted information on an Internet Web site which
is accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions. A passive Web site that does
little more than make information available to those who are interested
10
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erally, the establishment of personal jurisdiction is "directly proportionate
to the nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts
over the Internet."48 If a company has clearly conducted business over the
Internet with the forum state, then the forum state's exercise of personal
jurisdiction is proper. 49 CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson5° is the leading exam-
ple of a case where the nonresident defendant's business contacts with the
forum state supported the exercise of personal jurisdiction. 5 1
Courts have usually refused to exercise personal jurisdiction when the
defendant's only contact with the forum state was the posting of a passive
Web site. 52 A passive Web site merely provides information to the
in it is not grounds for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. The middle
ground is occupied by interactive Web sites where a user can exchange
information with the host computer. In these cases, the exercise ofjuris-
diction is determined by examining the level of interactivity and commer-
cial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the Web site.
Id. at 1124 (citations omitted).
48. Id.
49. For a further discussion of a forum state's exercise of personal jurisdiction
based upon a defendant's business contacts, see infra notes 113-14 and accompany-
ing text.
50. 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
51. See id. In CompuServe, the defendant (a Texas resident) had entered into a
contract with the plaintiff (an Ohio corporation) to provide software. See id. at
1259-60. The contract stated that Ohio law would govern. See id. at 1260. The
defendant transmitted 32 software files to the plaintiff, which then made these files
available for downloading by subscribers. See id. at 1261. According to the defend-
ant, he sold about $650 worth of software to Ohio residents. See id.
After the defendant complained that the plaintiff was infringing on his
software trademarks, the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment finding that it
had not infringed on any of the defendant's trademarks in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Ohio. See id. at 1261. The district court
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. See id.
at 1261. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit re-
versed the lower court's decision, holding that the defendant was subject to per-
sonal jurisdiction in Ohio. See id. at 1268-69. The Sixth Circuit found that the
defendant had purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting business
in Ohio by entering into a contract with an Ohio-based company, transmitting
software to Ohio over a three year period and contacting the plaintiff by phone,
mail and email when he believed they were infringing on his software's trademark.
See id. at 1264-67.
52. See, e.g., Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419-20 (9th Cir.
1997) (holding that passive web site did not show purposeful availment); Edberg v.
Neogen Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 104, 115 (D. Conn. 1998) (holding that mainte-
nance of Web site alone did not support personal jurisdiction in Connecticut);
CFOs 2 Go, Inc. v. CFO 2 Go, Inc., No. CIV.A.97-4676 SL, 1998 WL 320821, at *3
(N.D. Cal. June 5, 1998) (finding that incomplete Web page was not enough for
personal jurisdiction); Transcraft Corp. v. Doonan Trailer Corp., No. 97-C.V.A.
4943, 1997 WL 733905, at *9-10 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 1997) (deciding that defend-
ant's Web site did not justify personal jurisdiction in Illinois); Weber v. Jolly Ho-
tels, 977 F. Supp. 327, 333 (D.N.J. 1997) (finding that defendant's Web advertising
did not support personal jurisdiction); Smith v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 968 F.
Supp. 1356, 1365 (W.D. Ark. 1997) (concluding that Web site advertisement was
insufficient contact with forum for personal jurisdiction); Hearst Corp. v. Gold-
berger, No. 96 CIV.A. 3620, 1997 WL 97097, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997) (com-
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viewer. 5 3 In Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King,54 the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York held that a passive Web site
did not justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the nonresident
defendant. 55 A few courts, however, have found that the creation of a
passive Web site did justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction. 56
paring defendant's Web site "to an advertisement in a national publication" that
did not support personal jurisdiction); Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124 (noting that
maintenance of passive Web site did not expose nonresident defendant to per-
sonal jurisdiction); McDonough v. Fallon McElligott, Inc., No. CIV.95-4037, 1996
WL 753991, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 1996) (recognizing that Web site alone was not
enough to establish personal jurisdiction); Ragonese v. Rosenfeld, 722 A.2d 991,
995-96 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1998) (characterizing defendant's page as passive
and therefore not supporting personal jurisdiction).
53. See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124 (defining passive Web site).
54. 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).
55. See id. at 299-300 (holding passive Web site did not support personal juris-
diction). In Bensusan, the plaintiff, who owned a New York City jazz club called
"The Blue Note," sued the defendant, an owner of a Missouri club also called "The
Blue Note," for infringing on his rights to the trademark "The Blue Note." See id.
at 297. The defendant had promoted his small club on a Web page. See id.
(describing defendant's Internet activities). The Web page provided information
on the defendant's club, addresses of locations to buy tickets and a phone number
to call and charge tickets. See id. To pick up the tickets, people had to go to the
club in Columbia, Missouri. See id. The court refused to exercise jurisdiction over
the defendant under the New York Long-Arm statute and due process because the
defendant had "done nothing to purposefully avail himself of the benefits of New
York." Id. at 301. The court compared the defendant's creation of the Web site to
placing a product in the stream of commerce, which was not enough for personal
jurisdiction without something more. See id. Even though it was foreseeable that a
New York resident might have viewed this Web site and become confused as to the
relationship between the two clubs, this was not enough for personal jurisdiction.
See id. (dismissing foreseeability as grounds for personal jurisdiction).
One commentator has pointed out that Bensusan offers dubious precedent
because it was decided under the New York Long-Arm Statute, which is more re-
strictive than due process. See Todd D. Leitstein, A Solution for Personal Jurisdiction
on the Internet, 59 LA. L. REv. 565, 577-78 (1999) (finding use of Bensusan for passive
analysis "problematic"). Therefore, courts can distinguish Internet cases based on
less restrictive state long-arm statutes from Bensusan. See id. The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania also recognized that Ben-
susan offered limited precedent. See Barrett v. Catacombs Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d
717, 725 n.3 (noting that Bensusan and Hearst decisions were only "instructive" be-
cause they were decided under New York Long-Arm Statute).
56. See Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 164-65 (D.
Conn. 1996) (holding that Web site with toll-free number subjected defendant to
personal jurisdiction in Connecticut). In this case, the district court focused on
the worldwide availability of the defendant's Web site. See id. Based on the defend-
ant's Web site, the court concluded that the defendant had attempted to advertise
in every state including Connecticut. See id. at 165 (recognizing that Internet is
"designed to communicate with people and their businesses in every state"). The
court concluded that the defendant had purposefully availed itself of acting in
Connecticut because its Web site was available to the entire nation including
10,000 Connecticut residents. See id. at 165.
Other courts have followed this reasoning. See Telco Communications v. An
Apple A Day, 977 F. Supp. 404, 406-07 (E.D. Va. 1997) (following Inset to hold that
Web site advertisement subjected defendant to personal jurisdiction in Virginia);
[Vol. 45: p. 353
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In cases where the level of Web site activity fell in between a totally
passive site and an actively commercial site, courts have examined the
amount of commercial interactivity to determine whether personal juris-
diction was proper.5 7 In Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc.,58 the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri held personal jurisdic-
tion was proper because the defendant had actively solicited Internet users
from all over the world including the forum state, Missouri.59 Internet
Heroes, Inc. v. Heroes Found., 958 F. Supp. 1, 4-5 (D.D.C. 1996) (suggesting that
Web site with toll-free number that was always available to forum residents might
be enough to support exercise of personal jurisdiction in forum); State v. Granite
Gate Resorts, Inc., No. CIV.A.6-95-7227, 1996 WL 767431, at *11 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
Dec. 11, 1996) (concluding that defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction in
Minnesota because it had purposefully availed itself of conducting business there
when it "place[d] its ad on the Internet 24 hours, seven days a week, 365 days a
year"), affd, 576 N.W.2d 747 (Minn. 1998). But see Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Comput-
ing, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 34, 46 (D. Mass. 1997) (expressing reservations about hold-
ings in Inset, Heroes and Maritz).
57. See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124 (setting forth personal jurisdiction analysis
for "interactive Web sites where a user can exchange information with the host
computer").
58. 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
59. See id. at 1333-34 (finding that defendant had purposefully availed itself of
privilege of acting in Missouri and could have anticipated being haled into court
there). The defendant, based in California, had created a Web site promoting its
services. See id. at 1330. Users could sign up on the defendant's mailing list and
receive an electronic mailbox. See id. In signing up for a mailbox, users would
specify particular areas of interest and the defendant would then send the users
advertisements that matched these interests. See id. The defendant planned on
charging advertisers for access to these users. See id. The service was not opera-
tional yet. See id. According to the court, Missouri residents accessed this service
311 times although at least 180 times were by the plaintiff. See id. Because the
defendant had transmitted its Web site promotion approximately 131 times to Mis-
souri residents, the court found that the defendant had purposefully availed itself
of the privilege of acting in Missouri. See id. at 1333 (finding Missouri could exer-
cise personal jurisdiction over defendant). One court, however, has characterized
Maritz as a passive Web site case rather than an interactive site case. See Hasbro, 994
F. Supp. at 46 ("I have reservations about decisions such as Inset, Heroes, and Maritz
which found that the existence of a Web site alone is enough to allow jurisdiction
in any state."). Thompson v. Handa-Lopez, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 738 (W.D. Tex. 1998)
might be a better example of an interactive Web site that supported the exercise of
personal jurisdiction. In that case, the plaintiff sued the defendant in Texas for
breach of contract, fraud and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices
Act. See id. at 741. The defendant ran an Internet casino from California. See id.
The plaintiff claimed that he had won approximately $193,728.40 through the de-
fendant's Web site and the defendant refused to pay this money. See id. The de-
fendant attempted to escape personal jurisdiction in Texas by claiming it did not
have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum. See id. at 743. Because the de-
fendant's Web site had continuously interacted with the plaintiff in Texas, the
court held that the exercise of personal jurisdiction was proper. See id. at 744 (not-
ing defendant "continuously interacted with the casino players, entering into con-
tracts with them as they played the various games"). The defendant interacted
with the plaintiff even more than the defendants in Maritz and Inset. See id. (recog-
nizing defendant did more over Internet than merely maintain Web site with toll-
free phone number).
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users interacted with the defendant's Web site by signing onto the defend-
ant's mailing list.60
2. Other Approaches to Examining Personal Jurisdiction on the Internet
A few courts have analyzed personal jurisdiction on the Internet
under the stream of commerce theory.6 1 In Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing,
Inc.,62 the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
stated that posting information on a Web site was "most analogous to ...
placing a product in the 'stream of commerce."' 63 According to that
court, courts can use the stream of commerce theory to decide whether a
Web site has targeted the forum state.64 Ultimately, the district court con-
cluded that the defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction in the fo-
rum because it had directed its Internet advertising to the entire nation
including the forum and had conducted business with a forum
company.
6 5
Courts have also considered defendants' non-Internet, as well as In-
ternet, contacts in deciding whether personal jurisdiction was proper.66
In Blumenthal v. Drudge,6 7 for example, the district court found personal
jurisdiction was proper in the District of Columbia based upon the defend-
ant's Internet, mail and phone contacts with forum residents. 68 The de-
fendant's Internet activities consisted of a Web site with District of
Columbia gossip, a contract with America Online to publish this gossip
and contributions from at least fifteen forum residents who responded to
60. See Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1332-34 (holding that defendant's interactive
Web site supported personal jurisdiction).
61. See, e.g., Transcraft Corp. v. Doonan Trailer Corp., No. 97-ClV.A.-4943,
1997 WL 733905, *8-9 (N.D. I11. Nov. 17, 1997) (using stream of commerce analysis
to examine defendant's Internet activities); Hasbro, 994 F. Supp. at 4245 (analyz-
ing defendant's contacts under stream of commerce theory); Smith v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1356, 1362-64 (W.D. Ark. 1997) (referring to
stream of commerce theory); Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295,
301 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (comparing creation of Web site to placement of product in
stream of commerce, which does not support personal jurisdiction without some
additional act), affd, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).
62. 994 F. Supp. 34 (D. Mass. 1997).
63. Id. at 42. For more specific information on the Asahi analysis, see supra
note 34 and accompanying text.
64. See Hasbro, 994 F. Supp. at 42 (recommending use of Asahi analysis).
65. See id. at 45 (finding defendant's Internet activity satisfied purposeful
availment requirement of due process).
66. For a further discussion of how courts use Internet and non-Internet con-
tacts to support personal jurisdiction, see infra note 117 and accompanying text.
67. 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998).
68. See id. at 56 (basing personal jurisdiction on defendant's activities on and
off Internet). In this case, the defendant was a gossip columnist who resided in
California. See id. at 46. The defendant wrote allegedly defamatory statements
about the plaintiffs that appeared on America Online as well as the defendant's
own Web site. See id. at 47-48.
[Vol. 45: p. 353
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his Web site.6 9 In addition to these Internet activities, the defendant had
also visited the District of Columbia twice (once for an interview with C-
SPAN), mailed and phoned forum residents to obtain information. 70
Based upon all of these activities, the court held that the exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendant was proper.7 '
In cases involving tortious conduct, courts have invoked the Calder
effects test to determine whether a defendant's Internet contacts sup-
ported personal jurisdiction. 7 2 In Panavision International v. Toeppen,7 3 for
example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
that the defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction in California under
the effects test.7 4 Under the effects test, the court concluded that the de-
fendant had purposely targeted his tortious behavior at California and
knew that the plaintiff would suffer the most injury there. 7 5 Therefore,
69. See id. at 56-57 (describing defendant's Internet contacts).
70. See id. at 57 (listing defendant's non-Internet contacts with D.C.).
71. See id. at 56-58 (finding defendant had sufficient minimum contacts with
D.C. for exercise of personal jurisdiction).
72. See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1321-22 (9th Cir.
1998) (utilizing effects test because case was "akin to a tort case"); Barrett v. Cata-
combs Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717, 729-31 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (finding that effects test
did not support exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendant accused of defa-
mation); Edias Software Int'l, L.L.C., v. Basis Int'l Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413, 420-21
(D. Ariz. 1996) (using effects test to find defendant was subject to personal juris-
diction in Arizona for defamatory comments directed to forum); Blakey v. Conti-
nental Airlines, Inc., 730 A.2d 854, 863 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (referring
to effects test that did not support exercise of personal jurisdiction over defend-
ants). But see Howard B. Stravitz, PersonalJurisdiction in Cyberspace: Something More is
Required on the Electronic Stream of Commerce, 49 S.C. L. REv. 925, 936-37 (1998) (ar-
guing that Edias misapplied effects test because defendant suffered harm in Eu-
rope not Arizona). For discussion of the Calder decision, see supra notes 36-39 and
accompanying text.
73. 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
74. See id. at 1321-22 (exercising personal jurisdiction over nonresident de-
fendant under effects test). In this case, the plaintiff, Panavision, accused the de-
fendant, Dennis Toeppen, of trademark dilution. See id. at 1318. The defendant
had registered and used the plaintiff's trademarks as domain names. See id. at
1318-19. After the plaintiff told the defendant to stop using these trademarks, the
defendant offered to sell the domain names back to the plaintiff. See id. at 1319.
The defendant had engaged in "cybersquatting" before. See id. (noting that de-
fendant had registered over 100 marks as domain names and attempted to sell at
least 2).
75. See id. at 1321-22 (using "effects test" to subject nonresident defendant to
personal jurisdiction in California). The defendant had engaged in tortious-like
conduct by intentionally registering the plaintiff's trademarks as domain names
and then attempting to extort money from the plaintiff for these marks. See id. at
1321. The plaintiff's principal place of business was California, and the defendant
knew that the plaintiff would suffer the most harm there. See id. Therefore, under
the "effects test" the defendant had purposefully availed himself of the privilege of
acting in California. See id. at 1322 (rejecting defendant's argument that he had
no contacts with California).
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California could exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant.7 6 In
Barrett, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania used a combination of these
approaches in finding that the nonresident defendant was not subject to
personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania for her noncommercial, allegedly de-
famatory Internet activities. 77
III. FACTS
In Barrett, the plaintiff, Stephen Barrett, a Pennsylvania psychiatrist,
sued multiple defendants including Darlene Sherrell, an Oregon resident,
for defamation under Pennsylvania law. 78 The defendant moved for the
court to dismiss the plaintiffs lawsuit for lack of personal jurisdiction
under rule 12(b) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 79
This lawsuit arose from the plaintiff's activities as a consumer health
advocate on the Internet. 80 On his Web site, Quackwatch, the plaintiff pro-
vided information about a number of healthcare issues including the ben-
efits of fluoridation. 8 1 The defendant opposed the fluoridation of water
76. See id. at 1322-24 (affirming district court's ruling that defendant was sub-
ject to personal jurisdiction in California).
77. For a further discussion of the Barrett analysis, see infra notes 112-53 and
accompanying text.
78. See Barrett v. Catacombs Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717, 720-22 (E.D. Pa. 1999)
(discussing parties to lawsuit). In addition to the defendant, the plaintiff also sued
Catacombs Press, James R. Privitera, Alan Stang and CDS Networks, Inc. See id.
(identifying additional defendants). Only defendant, Darlene Sherrell, moved to
dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). See id. (noting de-
fendant's motion to dismiss).
Recently, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania granted Catacombs Press, James R. Privitera and Alan Stang's collective
motion for summary judgment. See Barrett v. Catacombs Press, No. CIV.99-736,
1999 WL 705910, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 2, 1999). The district court held that the
Pennsylvania statute of limitations for defamation had run. See id. at *3. The
plaintiff's lawsuit against CDS Networks, Inc., was settled at an earlier date. See id.
at *8 (noting that suit against CDS was dismissed with plaintiffs agreement).
79. See Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 722-23 (describing defendant's motion).
8,0. See id. at 720 (giving background of case). The plaintiff had been involved
in consumer health issues such as fraud and misinformation since 1969. See id.
(examining plaintiffs occupation as consumer activist). In December of 1996, the
plaintiff created a Web site called Quackwatch (http://www.quackwatch.com),
which provided information about a variety of consumer health issues including a
brief (about 1% of the site) discussion of fluoridation. See id. at 720-21 (discussing
content of Web site). The plaintiffs information on fluoridation included
hypertext links to other sites that "promote[d] fluoridation of public water
sources." See id. at 721.
81. See id. at 721-22 (discussing plaintiff's materials on fluoridation). In addi-
tion to his Web site information, the plaintiff had edited some articles and a book
that positively mentioned the fluoridation of water. See id. at 721.
The plaintiff's Web site provides extensive information on a number of con-
sumer health issues including quackery, questionable medical treatments and diet-
ary information. See Stephen Barrett, Quackwatch (last modified Oct. 11, 1999)
<http://www.quackwatch.com> (listing consumer health resources). There is one
page with an article by Bob Sprague and Mary Berhardt debunking anti-fluorida-
tion activists. See Stephen Barrett, Quackwatch (visited Oct. 11, 1999) <http://www.
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and joined a health fraud discussion group co-sponsored by Quackwatch.82
In addition to her activities on the plaintiff's Web site, the defendant at-
tempted to discuss fluoridation with the plaintiff by email, but he did not
respond. 8
3
Shortly thereafter, the defendant made allegedly defamatory com-
ments about the plaintiff on her own Web site.84 After the plaintiff sent
the defendant an email threatening to sue, the defendant modified her
Web page.85 The defendant also posted messages on several health-re-
lated listservs and Usenet groups with a hypertext link back to her Web site
(that contained the allegedly defamatory statements). 86
The plaintiff sued the defendant for defamation in Pennsylvania.
8 7
The defendant's contacts with Pennsylvania consisted of her Internet activ-
quackwatch.com/03HealthPromotion/fluoride.html> (criticizing tactics of anti-
fluoridationists). This page includes links to other pro-fluoridation sites such as
the American Dental Association and American Academy of Pediatrics. See id.
82. See Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 722 ("Defendant is closely associated with
individuals who are interested in advocating against the fluoridation of water
sources throughout the United States."). The plaintiff noticed the defendant after
she joined the discussion group. See id. at 721. The defendant claimed that she
posted one message to the group and also responded to other members' posts. See
id. at 722. The plaintiff, however, claimed that the defendant posted so many
messages that he was forced to post a message stating that the discussion had be-
come "unproductive." See id. at 721-22 (contrasting plaintiffs claims with
defendant's).
83. See id. at 722, 729 (stating that plaintiff did not respond to defendant's
email).
84. See id. at 722 (describing appearance of defendant's defamatory com-
ments). Currently the defendant's Web site contains alarge amount of informa-
tion on the dangers of fluoridation. See Darlene Sherrell, DentalFluorosis Prevention
Program (last modifiedJuly 25, 1999) <http://www.ia4u.net/~sherrell/> [hereinaf-
ter Sherrell, Dental Fluorosis] (providing information on dangers of fluoridation).
Clicking on the "Bogus Consumer Watchdogs" button takes the user to a Web
page criticizing various pro-fluoridation activists including the plaintiff. See
Darlene Sherrell, Consumer Reports Stephen Barrett and Other Bogus Consumer Watch-
dogs (visited Oct. 14, 1999) <http://www.ia4u.net/-sherrell/yia.htm> [hereinafter
Sherrell, Consumer Reports] (discussing pro-fluoridation activists). On this page, the
defendant critiques the plaintiffs use of the phrase "poison mongers." See id.
85. See Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 722 (noting that defendant modified her Web
page after plaintiff complained). According to the defendant, her modifications
made it clear that she was quoting another defendant, James R. Privitera. See id.
(mentioning defendant's modifications).
86. See id. (discussing defendant's postings to other listservs and Usenet
groups). These groups included a Dental Public Health List with national distribu-
tion, a Chiro-List with about 350 chiropractors, sci.med.dentistry,
misc.health.alternative (a busy newsgroup with "tens of thousands of participants")
and misc.kids.health. See id. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant had "posted
a total of at least 90 messages to at least 12 Usenet news groups, with total member-
ship in the tens of thousands, and that many of these messages encouraged people
to visit one or more [of] her sites that contained defamatory statements." See id.
The court, however, questioned this claim. See id.
87. See id. at 720.
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ities and a few visits during a fluoridation lawsuit in the 1980s.8 8 In mov-
ing to dismiss the lawsuit for lack of personal jurisdiction, the defendant
argued that she had not visited Pennsylvania other than for the previous
lawsuit and that her Internet activities were directed to the world at large
rather than Pennsylvania."9 The district court granted the defendant's
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding that she had
not purposefully availed herself of the privilege of acting in Pennsylvania
nor caused the plaintiff harm in Pennsylvania as a result of her tortious
conduct.90
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Narrative Analysis
1. District Court's Examination of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
As the district court noted, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure gov-
ern whether a federal court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a de-
fendant.9 ' Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a federal court's
exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant depends
upon state law.92 Federal courts may exercise personal jurisdiction if the
state long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of personal jurisdiction and
if personal jurisdiction would not violate the Due Process Clause of the
United States Constitution.9 3
Thus, to determine whether Pennsylvania allowed the district court to
exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the court examined the
Pennsylvania Long-Arm Statute.9 4 Under the Pennsylvania Long-Arm
Statute, personal jurisdiction extends to the limits of the Due Process
88. See id. at 722 (setting forth defendant's contacts with Pennsylvania). The
defendant's non-Internet activities in Pennsylvania were related to a major fluori-
dation lawsuit in the late 1970s and early 1980s. See id.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 730-31.
91. See id. at 723. For the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, see supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
92. See Provident Nat'l Bank v. California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 819 F.2d
434, 436 (3d Cir. 1987) ("A federal district court may assert personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident of the state in which the court sits to the extent authorized by
the law of that state."); FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1) (basing exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion on state where district court sits).
93. See Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 723 (describing two-prong analysis of per-
sonal jurisdiction). For a further discussion of personal jurisdiction, see supra
notes 19-42 and accompanying text.
94. See id. at 723 (looking at Pennsylvania Long-Arm Statute). The Penn-
sylvania Long-Arm Statute allows a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant in several situations. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN § 5322
(West 1998) (setting forth acts that subject nonresident defendant to personal ju-
risdiction in Pennsylvania). A nonresident defendant who caused "harm or tor-
tious injury . . . by an act or omission" in Pennsylvania is subject to personal
jurisdiction. See id.
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Clause.95 Because the court determined that Pennsylvania's Long-Arm
statute was co-extensive with the Constitution, it proceeded to the Due
Process Clause inquiry.9 6
2. District Court's Analysis of Traditional Due Process Requirements
The district court next analyzed whether the exercise of personal ju-
risdiction over the defendant was proper under due process. 97 In address-
ing this issue, the court distinguished between general and specific
jurisdiction. 98 General jurisdiction is proper when the defendant has en-
gaged in "systematic and continuous" contacts with the forum state.9 9 The
district court concluded that the defendant's contacts with Pennsylvania
did not justify the exercise of general jurisdiction. 10 0 The district court
stated that the defendant's Internet activities did not amount to "system-
atic and continuous" contacts with Pennsylvania. 0 1
95. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5322(b) (West 1998) (stating that personal
jurisdiction extended "to the fullest extent allowed under the Constitution of the
United States and may be based on the most minimum contact with this Common-
wealth allowed under the Constitution of the United States").
96. See Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 723 (moving on to due process analysis). The
Third Circuit has held that the two-prong inquiry collapses into a single inquiry
because the Pennsylvania Long-Arm statute allows courts to exercise personal juris-
diction to the limits of the Constitution. See Mellon Bank (East) PSFS, Nat'l Ass'n
v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1221 (3d Cir. 1992) (finding that court may exercise
personal jurisdiction so long as it does not violate due process because Penn-
sylvania Long-Arm statute extends personal jurisdiction to limits of Constitution);
Empire Abrasive Equip. v. H.H. Watson, 567 F.2d 554, 556 (3d Cir. 1977) (same).
But see Lehigh Coal & Navigation Co. v. Geko-Mayo, 56 F. Supp. 2d 559, 564 n.7
(E.D. Pa. 1999) (criticizing courts that collapse two-prong inquiry into single in-
quiry and only analyze personal jurisdiction under due process rather than first
looking at whether claim falls under Pennsylvania Long-Arm statute).
97. See Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 723 (moving onto due process analysis).
98. See id. at 722-24 (discussing differences between specific and general juris-
diction). For a further discussion of the differences between specific and general
jurisdiction, see supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
99. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414-17
(1984) (finding defendant lacked sufficient contacts with Texas to support exer-
cise of personal jurisdiction). For a further discussion of general jurisdiction, see
supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
100. See Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 723 (stating that "general jurisdiction is
clearly inapplicable in this case").
101. See id. at 723-24 (dismissing plaintiff's claim that exercise of general juris-
diction was proper). The court compared the national accessibility of the defend-
ant's Internet activities with national publications. See id. at 724. According to the
Third Circuit, national publications did not qualify as the continuous and substan-
tial contacts required for general jurisdiction. See Gehling v. St. George's Sch. of
Med., Ltd., 773 F.2d 539, 542 (3d Cir. 1985) (refusing to exercise general jurisdic-
tion over nonresident defendant based upon advertisements in New York Times
and Wall StreetJournal); Reliance Steel Prods. Co. v. Watson, Ess, Marshall & Eng-
gas, 675 F.2d 587, 589 (3d Cir. 1982) (concluding that defendant's advertisement
in Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory did not support exercise of general jurisdiction).
In Gehling, parents had sued a Grenada medical school for negligence, breach of
contact, fraudulent misrepresentation and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
2000] NOTE
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Because the defendant's Internet contacts with Pennsylvania did not
support general jurisdiction, the district court moved onto the specific ju-
risdiction analysis. 10 2 The court defined specific jurisdiction as arising
when "the defendant, the cause of action, and the forum fall [s] within the
'minimum contacts' framework first announced in International Shoe...
and later refined by the abundant progeny of that landmark case."1 0 3 To
support the exercise of specific jurisdiction, a defendant must have had
sufficient minimum contacts with Pennsylvania so "that the maintenance
of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice."'" 10 4 Although the defendant was not physically present in Penn-
sylvania, the district court pointed out that physical presence was no
longer necessary to establish personal jurisdiction.1 0 5
The district court used two standards to determine whether it could
exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 10 6 First, the defendant
must have had such minimum contacts with the forum state so that she
could "reasonably anticipate being haled into court there."10 7 In analyz-
ing this issue, the district court stated that courts should examine the
"quality of the contacts between the forum, the defendant and the litiga-
tion."' 08 The district court also noted that it had to determine whether
the cause of action arose from the defendant's contacts with the forum
and whether the defendant purposefully availed himself or herself of the
privilege of acting in the forum. 10 9 If the defendant had sufficient mini-
tress following the death of their son. See Gehling, 773 F.2d at 540. The defend-
ant's contacts with Pennsylvania consisted of advertisements in the New York Times
and Wall Street Journal (both widely available in Pennsylvania) and correspondence
with the plaintiffs' son. See id. at 542-43. The court held that these contacts were
too small to find that the defendant had a "continuous and substantial business
relationship with Pennsylvania." Id. at 543.
102. See Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 724 (rejecting general jurisdiction analysis
and using specific jurisdiction analysis instead).
103. Id. at 723 (quoting Mellon Bank (East) PSFS, Nat'l Ass'n v. Farino, 960 F.2d
1217, 1221 (3d Cir. 1992)). For discussion of specific jurisdiction, see supra notes
26-34 and accompanying text.
104. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quot-
ing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). For a further discussion of Interna-
tional Shoe, see supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
105. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985) (rejecting
necessity of defendant's physical presence in forum).
106. See Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 724 (applying two standards to decide if
personal jurisdiction was proper).
107. Pennzoil Prods. Co. v. Colelli & Assocs., 149 F.3d 197, 201 (3d Cir. 1998)
(quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)). For a
further discussion of the reasonably anticipate being haled into court standard, see
supra note 30 and accompanying text.
108. Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 724; see Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204
(1977) (giving other factors to consider).
109. See Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 724 (discussing requirements of due process
for exercise of personal jurisdiction); see also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253
(1958) (same). For a further discussion of the purposeful availment standard, see
supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
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mum contacts, then the district court had to consider whether the exer-
cise of personal jurisdiction would comport with "fair play and substantial
justice." 110 Finally, the district court pointed out that this analysis would
not produce clear cut answers.
111
3. District Court's Analysis of Personal Jurisdiction Cases Involving the
Internet
After establishing the principles of personal jurisdiction, the district
court examined how other courts have applied these principles to the In-
ternet. 112 According to the district court, courts have usually focused on
the "nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over
the Internet."113 As the district court pointed out, courts have generally
exercised personal jurisdiction when the defendant conducted business
over the Internet. 1 4 In more difficult cases, courts have attempted to
base personal jurisdiction on the Web site's "level of interactivity and com-
mercial nature of the information."1 15 The district court also acknowl-
110. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quot-
ing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). For a discussion of the reasonable-
ness prong, see supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
111. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978) (recognizing that
"test of International Shoe is not susceptible of mechanical application").
112. See Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 724 (looking at precedent).
113. Id.; see Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com., Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124
(W.D. Pa. 1997) (stating that "likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitu-
tionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial
activity that an entity conducts over the Internet").
114. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1264-65 (6th Cir. 1996)
(holding that defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction in Ohio because he
had entered into written contract with Ohio-based corporation and supplied that
corporation with software); Thompson v. Handa-Lopez, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 738,
743-44 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (holding that Texas could exercise personal jurisdiction
over defendant because defendant had entered into contracts with Texas residents
over online casino); Superguide Corp. v. Kegan, 987 F. Supp. 481, 486-87
(W.D.N.C. 1997) (deciding that North Carolina could exercise personal jurisdic-
tion over defendant because defendant conducted business through Web site ac-
cessible by North Carolina residents); Gary Scott Int'l, Inc. v. Baroudi, 981 F. Supp.
714, 716-17 (D. Mass. 1997) (finding that defendant was subject to personal juris-
diction in Massachusetts because he had sold 12 humidors to forum company,
solicited business from forum on his Web site and planned to sell products to
company with stores in forum); Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1125-26 (finding that de-
fendant was subject to personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania because defendant
had sold passwords to approximately 3,000 Pennsylvania residents and entered
into contracts with seven Pennsylvania ISPs).
115. Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 725; see Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130
F.3d 414, 418-19 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that defendant was not subject to per-
sonaljurisdiction in Arizona because it had merely posted passive Web site); ESAB
Group, Inc. v. Centricut, LLC, 34 F. Supp. 2d 323, 329-33 (D.S.C. 1999) (finding
that South Carolina could not exercise personal jurisdiction over defendant be-
cause although Web site was interactive viewer could not buy anything through site
without first calling toll-free number to set up account); CFOs 2 Go, Inc. v. CFO 2
Go, Inc., No. CIV.A.97-4676 SI, 1998 WL 320821, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 1998)
(deciding that defendant's incomplete Web site did not support personal jurisdic-
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edged that a few courts have held that a Web site alone is enough to
trigger personal jurisdiction.1 16 Other courts have used defendants' non-
Internet and Internet contacts to establish personal jurisdiction. 117 In tort
cases, as the district court recognized, courts have analyzed personal juris-
diction issues under the effects test.1 18
The district court had to determine whether the defendant's Internet
contacts with Pennsylvania were sufficient to justify personal jurisdic-
tion in California); Transcraft Corp. v. Doonan Trailer Corp., No. 97 C 4943, 1997
WL 733905, at *8-10 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 1997) (holding that defendant was not
subject to personal jurisdiction in Illinois because defendant conducted no busi-
ness with forum through Web site or email); Smith v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,
968 F. Supp. 1356, 1364-65 (W.D. Ark. 1997) (concluding that Arkansas could not
exercise personal jurisdiction over defendant because Internet ad for defendant's
products did not constitute sufficient minimum contacts).
116. See Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 725 (recognizing that some courts have
found personal jurisdiction based on passive Web sites). The majority of courts,
however, require more than a Web site to trigger personal jurisdiction. See id. (stat-
ing that "weight of case law... seems to favor ... something more than a Web site
that acts as a worldwide advertisement to trigger personal jurisdiction"). For a
further discussion of passive Web sites and personal jurisdiction, see supra notes
52-56 and accompanying text.
117. See Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 726 (discussing cases where courts used non-
Internet and Internet activities to support exercise of personal jurisdiction); see,
e.g., Mieczkowski v. Masco Corp., 997 F. Supp. 782, 788 (E.D. Tex. 1998) (holding
that general jurisdiction was proper based upon defendant's Web site and sales to
Texas); Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 34, 44-45 (D. Mass.
1997) (deciding that defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction in Massachu-
setts because it had maintained Web site and done business with forum company);
Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 54-56 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding that defend-
ant's Internet contacts, phone calls to D.C. residents and visits to D.C. supported
personal jurisdiction); America Network, Inc. v. Access America/Connect Atlanta,
975 F. Supp. 494, 498-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that Web site and contracts to
provide software to six New York residents supported New York's exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction over defendant); Resuscitation Techs., Inc. v. Continental Health
Care Corp., No. IP 96-1457-C-M/S, 1997 WL 148567, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 24,
1997) (concluding that Indiana could exercise personal jurisdiction over defend-
ant based upon defendant's email, phone and mail contacts with plaintiff in fo-
rum); Digital Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 462 (D. Mass.
1997) (holding that Massachusetts could exercise personal jurisdiction over de-
fendant because defendant had entered into contract with Massachusetts company
and maintained Web site accessible by Massachusetts residents); Cody v. Ward, 954
F. Supp. 43, 47 (D. Conn. 1997) (deciding that Connecticut could exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant because defendant had made fraud-
ulent misrepresentations to Connecticut resident by email and phone); Heroes,
Inc. v. Heroes Found., 958 F: Supp. 1, 4-5 (D.D.C. 1996) (holding that defendant's
Web site and local newspaper advertisement supported D.C.'s exercise of personal
jurisdiction); EDIAS Software Int'l, L.L.C. v. BASIS Int'l, Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413,
418-21 (D. Ariz. 1996) (finding that defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction
in Arizona based upon defendant's contractual, email, phone and fax contacts
with plaintiff).
118. For a discussion of the use of the effects test in tort cases, see supra notes
72-76 and accompanying text.
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tion.' 1 9 Unlike cases where defendants had non-Internet as well as In-
ternet contacts with the forum, 120 the defendant had "not recently
participated in any non-Internet related contacts with Pennsylvania resi-
dents."1 21 Therefore, the district court had to rely on the defendant's In-
ternet activities in deciding whether personal jurisdiction was proper. 12 2
a. District Court's Application of These Concepts to Defendant's Web
Page and Usenet Activities
The defendant's Internet activities consisted of two Web sites with al-
legedly defamatory information about the plaintiff and posts (occasionally
defamatory) to Usenet groups and listservs with links back to her Web
sites. 123 In deciding whether it could exercise personal jurisdiction over
the defendant, the district court had to decide whether the defendant's
Internet activities constituted sufficient minimum contacts. 124 The court
looked to previous personal jurisdiction cases to establish a range of mini-
mum contacts that would support the exercise of personal jurisdiction. 12 5
In deciding it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over the de-
fendant, the district court followed cases where courts had refused to find
personal jurisdiction based on defendants' maintenance of passive Web
sites.' 26 The district court noted that following courts that had found per-
sonal jurisdiction based upon passive Web sites would "subject anyone who
posted information on the Web to nationwide jurisdiction."1 2 7 With re-
gard to the defendant's additional Internet activities (posting to Usenet
discussion groups and listservs), the district court acknowledged that these
activities differed from maintaining a passive Web site but were sufficiently
119. See Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 726 (examining whether defendant had suf-
ficient minimum contacts with forum).
120. For a discussion of cases where defendants had non-Internet and In-
ternet contacts with the forum, see supra note 117 and accompanying text.
121. Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 726.
122. See id. at 727 (moving on to analysis of defendant's Internet activities).
123. See id. (discussing defendant's Internet activities). In a post to
misc.health.alternative, the defendant stated that the plaintiff only pretended to
be a consumer advocate. See id. The defendant also posted a message to
misc.kids.health questioning the reliability of the plaintiffs information. See id.
124. See id. (discussing constitutional test).
125. See id. (looking at "spectrum" of minimum contacts). Compare Asahi
Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (plurality opinion)
(holding that "placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without
more" did not constitute sufficient minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction),
with Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984) (finding that per-
sonal jurisdiction was proper where defendant had circulated national magazine
with libelous information about plaintiff in New Hampshire).
126. See Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 727 (deciding to follow Cybersell rather than
Inset and not exercise personal jurisdiction based upon defendant's Web sites).
For a further discussion of passive Web sites, see supra notes 52-56 and accompany-
ing text.
127. Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 727.
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similar to justify a denial of personal jurisdiction. 128 As the district court
pointed out, the defendant sent her messages to groups that were con-
cerned with national healthcare issues rather than groups aimed at Penn-
sylvania residents. 129
In comparing listservs and Usenet groups to passive Web sites, the
district court drew on some limited case law. 130 The district court also
emphasized the noncommercial nature of the defendant's activities.13 1
The defendant did not accept email addresses or credit card information
from forum residents,13 2 enter into a contract with a forum resident by
emai 1 33 or use her Web site to contact forum residents.' 34 Furthermore,
the defendant's defamatory comments attacked the plaintiff as a national
consumer advocate rather than a Pennsylvania psychiatrist. 135
128. See id. at 728 (comparing listserv and Usenet to passive Web site). Unlike
a Web site, posts to a Usenet group or listserv are actively sent to members of these
groups. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 834-35 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (discussing
how Usenet groups and listservs operate), afrd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
129. See Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 728-29 (examining national nature of de-
fendant's activities). Although Pennsylvania residents could subscribe to these
message groups, the district court found that this fact did not show that the de-
fendant had specifically targeted Pennsylvania residents. See id. (refusing to find
that defendant had targeted Pennsylvania just because Pennsylvania residents
could view her comments).
130. See id. at 728 (noting that "analogy of a listserve or USENET discussion
group to a 'passive' Web site comports with the limited case law on the relationship
between Internet activity and personal jurisdiction"); Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Comput-
ing, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 34, 42 (D. Mass. 1997) (pointing out that Web site providers
cannot limit accessibility of their sites to certain geographic areas unlike magazine
and newspaper distributors). Like Web sites providers, people posting to Usenet
groups and listservs cannot limit where their posts are received. See Barrett, 44 F.
Supp. 2d at 728 (discussing impossibility of "bypassing certain regions").
131. See Barrett, 44 F.Supp. 2d at 728 (distinguishing defendant's activities
from other Internet cases involving business activities).
132. See Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1333 (E.D. Mo.
1996) (finding that defendant purposefully availed itself of acting in Missouri by
creating Web site that requested browsers' email addresses).
133. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1263 (6th Cir. 1996)
(holding that defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction in Ohio because he
had contracted with Ohio-based plaintiff to distribute his software); Zippo Mfg.
Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1126-27 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (finding
that personal jurisdiction was proper over defendant because defendant had en-
tered into seven contracts with Pennsylvania ISPs and sold three thousand pass-
words to Pennsylvania residents).
134. See Gary Scott Int'l, Inc. v. Baroudi, 981 F. Supp. 714, 717 (D. Mass.
1997) (holding that defendant had used Web site to contact forum residents);
Hasbro, 994 F. Supp. at 44 (concluding that defendant was subject to personal juris-
diction in Massachusetts because defendant had conducted business with Massa-
chusetts residents through its Web site).
135. See Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 728-29 (noting that even plaintiff had not
found any statements of defendant attacking him as resident of Pennsylvania).
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b. District Court's Application of These Concepts to Defendant's Email
Communications with Plaintiff
Finally, the court refused to exercise personal jurisdiction over the
defendant based upon email between the defendant and the plaintiff.
1 3 6
The district court compared these emails to telephone calls or mail;
neither of which supported personal jurisdiction unless they showed pur-
poseful availment. 137 To exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant based upon mail or telephone calls, courts have required addi-
tional contacts or a substantial connection. 13 8 The district court con-
cluded that the emails between the defendant and the plaintiff were not
sufficient to support personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania.1 39
4. District Court's Rejection of Personal Jurisdiction under Effects Test
The district court also refused to exercise personal jurisdiction over
the defendant under the effects test of Calder.140 According to the district
court, the Third Circuit has found personal jurisdiction under the effects
test if: (1) the defendant has committed an intentional tort; (2) the forum
state was the focal point of the plaintiff's injury; and (3) the defendant's
tortious conduct was deliberately aimed at the forum state.
141
136. See id. at 729 (finding two emails did not justify personal jurisdiction).
The defendant had initially emailed the plaintiff to discuss fluoridation but the
plaintiff did not respond to her email. See id. After finding the defendant's Web
site, the plaintiff sent her an email threatening to sue her for defamation. See id.
The defendant replied to this email after she modified her Web page but this was
the extent of their email communications. See id.
137. See id. at 729 (stating that phone and mail contacts did not support per-
sonal jurisdiction if they did not meet purposeful availment standard); see also Mel-
lon Bank (East) PSFS, N.A. v. DiVeronica Bros., Inc., 983 F.2d 551, 556 (3d Cir.
1993) (holding that nonresident defendant was not subject to personal jurisdiction
in Pennsylvania because mail and phone calls to forum did not show defendant
had purposefully availed itself of benefit of conducting business in Pennsylvania);
Gehling v. St. George's Sch. of Med., Ltd., 773 F.2d 539, 544 (3d Cir. 1985) (decid-
ing that mail did not constitute purposeful availment); Reliance Steel Prods. Co. v.
Watson, Ess, Marshall & Enggas, 675 F.2d 587, 589 (3d Cir. 1982) (finding that
national advertisement and phone calls to forum did not subject nonresident de-
fendant to personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania).
138. SeeCarteret Sav. Bank v. Shushan, 954 F.2d 141,149 (3d Cir. 1992) (find-
ing that personal jurisdiction was proper over defendant who phoned, mailed and
traveled to New Jersey client); Mesalic v. Fiberfloat Corp., 897 F.2d 696, 701 (3d
Cir. 1990) (holding that New Jersey could exercise personal jurisdiction over de-
fendant who had mailed, phoned, delivered and repaired product in NewJersey).
139. See Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 729 (finding that emails did not support
exercise of personal jurisdiction).
140. See id. at 729-31 (rejecting plaintiffs argument that exercise of personal
jurisdiction over defendant was proper under effects test). For a further discussion
of Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), see supra notes 36-39 and accompanying
text.
141. See IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 265-66 (3d Cir. 1998)
(summarizing requirements of Calder effects test).
NOTE
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After discussing the basic requirements of the effects test, the district
court looked at how other courts had applied this test to online tortious
conduct.142 In Internet cases involving personal jurisdiction under the ef-
fects test, courts have focused on whether plaintiffs suffered the brunt of
their injuries in the forum. 143 The district court distinguished this lawsuit
from those cases by arguing that the defendant had attacked the plaintiff
as a national figure rather than a Pennsylvania psychiatrist.1 44 Because the
defendant did not aim her defamatory statements at the plaintiffs Penn-
sylvania role, the court found that her behavior did not satisfy the require-
ments of the effects test.1
45
The district court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that he suf-
fered most of the harm in Pennsylvania. 146 Although the district court
recognized that some harm to the plaintiff in Pennsylvania was foresee-
able, this foreseeability was not enough to justify personal jurisdiction. 47
Only a small number of Pennsylvania residents probably viewed the de-
fendant's defamatory statements (that were available worldwide).148 Ac-
cording to the court, "[u]nless Pennsylvania is deliberately or knowingly
targeted by the tortfeasor, the fact that harm is felt in Pennsylvania from
conduct occurring outside Pennsylvania is never sufficient to satisfy due
process." 149 Therefore, the district court refused to exercise personal ju-
142. See, e.g., Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1321-22 (9th
Cir. 1998) (finding that defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction under "ef-
fects test"); Transcraft Corp. v. Doonan Trailer Corp., No. 97 CIV.A.4943, 1997 WL
733905, *3-10 (N.D. III. Nov. 17, 1997) (refusing to exercise personal jurisdiction
over defendant under "effects test"); EDIAS Software Int'l, L.L.C. v. BASIS Int'l,
Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413, 418-21 (D. Ariz. 1996) (holding that defendant was subject
to personal jurisdiction under "effects test").
143. See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1322 (finding that plaintiff suffered most
harm in California where its business was based); EDIAS, 947 F. Supp. 413, 420
(recognizing that plaintiff suffered economic harm in Arizona).
144. See Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 730-31. The defendant attacked the plaintiff
and other commentators for their promotion of fluoridation and dismissal of chi-
ropractic. See id. at 730.
145. See id. at 731 ("Under the 'effects test' of Calder, we do not find that such
defamatory statements amount to actions 'expressly aimed' at Pennsylvania.").
146. See id. (finding that plaintiff did not suffer brunt of harm in
Pennsylvania).
147. For a discussion of foreseeability of injury and personal jurisdiction, see
supra note 30.
148. See Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 731 (recognizing probability that Penn-
sylvania residents observed defendant's defamatory comments). The district court
presumed Pennsylvania residents had viewed the defendant's comments even
though the plaintiff did not provide any evidence of access by Pennsylvanians. See
id. n.10.
149. Id. at 731; see Santana Prods., Inc. v. Bobrick Washroom Equip., 14 F.
Supp. 2d 710, 715 (M.D. Pa. 1998) (holding that harm to plaintiff in Pennsylvania
without minimum contacts did not support exercise of personal jurisdiction); Sur-
gical Laser Techs., Inc. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 281, 285 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(concluding that Pennsylvania could not exercise personal jurisdiction over de-
fendant because foreseeability of harm without activities directed toward forum
did not support personal jurisdiction).
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risdiction under the effects test because the defendant had not targeted
Pennsylvania and the plaintiff had only suffered limited harm in
Pennsylvania. 1
50
5. Fair Play and Substantial Justice
Because the plaintiff had not established the first requirement of due
process (that the defendant had sufficient minimum contacts with Penn-
sylvania), the district court was not required to decide whether the exer-
cise of personal jurisdiction would have been reasonable. 151 The district
court implied, however, that even if there had been sufficient minimum
contacts, it might not have found that the exercise of personal jurisdiction
was reasonable. 152 According to the district court, "the exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction over noncommercial on-line speech that does not pur-
posefully target any forum would result in hindering the wide range of
discussion permissible on listserves, USENET discussion groups and Web
sites that are informational in nature."1 5 3
B. Critical Analysis
1. District Court's Use of Purposeful Availment Standard Did Not Adapt Well
to the Internet
The district court's use of an active/passive Web site analysis to deter-
mine whether the defendant purposefully availed herself of the privilege
of acting in Pennsylvania illustrates the drawbacks of applying this tradi-
tional personal jurisdiction concept to the Internet.154 First, the court
had to stretch the passive Web site analysis to cover the defendant's non-
Web activities. 15 5 Second, the entire concept of a passive Web site is ques-
tionable.156 At some level, Web sites are never passive because they are
150. See Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 731. (refusing to find personal jurisdiction
was proper).
151. See Pennzoil Prods. Co. v. Colelli & Assoc., Inc., 149 F.3d 197, 201 (3d
Cir. 1998) (noting that fair play and substantial justice prong was discretionary).
152. See Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 731 (examining fairness issue briefly). The
district court noted that the plaintiff was entitled to relief and that either party
would be burdened to litigate in the other party's home state. See id. The plaintiff,
however, had sued and planned on suing more California residents so he was will-
ing to bear the burden of litigating outside Pennsylvania. See id.
153. Id.
154. For a discussion of problems with the active/passive Web site analysis,
see infra notes 155-68 and accompanying text.
155. See Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 728-29 (comparing defendant's posting list-
serv and Usenet messages to maintenance of passive Web site). The district court
did acknowledge that the Internet contacts were "technically differ[ent]" from a
Web site but used the passive Web site analysis anyway. Id. at 728.
156. See Betensky, supra note 10, at 18-20 (doubting that disseminating infor-
mation through Web site is passive); Martin H. Redish, Of New Wine and Old Bottles:
Personal Jurisdiction, the Internet, and Nature of Constitutional Evolution, 38JURMETRICS
J. 575, 591 (1998) (questioning whether putting up Web site is ever "passive act").
2000] NOTE
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transmitting information to an individual's computer. 157 And even if a
Web site is interactive, it does not necessarily prove that a defendant has
purposefully availed himself or herself of the privilege of acting in the
forum.' 58 Because the Internet contains no geographical boundaries, it is
impossible for Web site creators to keep non-forum state residents from
their sites. 1 59 This technological impossibility discredits some courts' rea-
soning that Web site creators have purposefully availed themselves of the
benefits of the forums where their Web sites are available, namely the en-
tire world.
1 60
157. See F. LAWRENCE STREET, LAW OF THE INTERNET xxvii (1998 ed.) (noting
that viewer's browser communicates with Web site to obtain information in order
to display page). A Web site that seems passive (only presenting information but
not requesting any information from the viewer) could actually be obtaining infor-
mation about the viewer through cookies. See Stein, supra note 12, at 1187 n.94
(noting that even passive Web sites can collect information about viewer through
cookies). Cookies are files that allow a Web site to collect information about a
visitor (such as the visitor's email address or other Web sites that the visitor has
visited) and then store that information on the visitor's own hard drive. See ROSE-
NOR, supra note 10, at 338. When that visitor returns to the Web site, the site can
identify the visitor by accessing the cookies on his or her hard drive. See Chip
Bayers, The Promise of One to One (A Love Story), WIRED, May 1998, at 184 (explaining
operation of cookies). A moderate Web surfer probably has at least 200 cookies
stored on his or her hard drive. See id. at 134. Many commercial Web sites use
cookies to track people viewing their Web site. See id. Unless a viewer sets his or
her browser to display a warning, he or she will never know that a Web site has
created or accessed a cookie. See id.
158. See, e.g., Millennium Enters., Inc. v. Millenium Music, Ltd., 33 F. Supp.
2d 907, 921-23 (D. Or. 1999) (declining to assert personal jurisdiction based upon
defendant's interactive Web site). According to the United States District Court
for the District Court of Oregon, the defendant's interactive Web site did not sat-
isfy the due process requirements of personal jurisdiction. See id. at 922. Accord-
ing to that court, a defendant may not anticipate being haled into a forum state's
court even though it created an interactive Web site. See id. (finding defendant's
interactive Web site did not show purposeful availment); see ESAB Group, Inc. v.
Centricut, LLC, 34 F. Supp. 2d 323, 330 (D.S.C. 1999) (stating that identifying
Web site as interactive did not resolve issue of personal jurisdiction). Instead, the
United States District Court for the District of South Carolina held that the exer-
cise of personal jurisdiction depended upon the amount of commercial activity
that the defendant conducted over the Internet with the forum. See id. at 330-33
(refusing to exercise general or specific jurisdiction over defendant because de-
fendant's only sale to forum occurred after lawsuit was filed and was engineered by
plaintiff).
159. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 12, at 1172-73 ("Internet communications are
routed to, from, and through places largely unknown and irrelevant to the
users."); Lowther, supra note 11, at 653 (stating that Internet "has no geography, is
not confined to any one territory, and gives everyone an instant presence every-
where"); Motty Shulman, Comment, http://www.personaLjurisdiction.com, 23 NovA
L. REv. 781, 807 (1999) (pointing out that Internet does not allow Web site creator
to limit availability of site to certain states). For a further discussion of the In-
ternet's lack of geographical boundaries, see supra note 130 and accompanying
text.
160. See Millennium, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 922 (criticizing these courts' reasoning
because Web sites do not "thrust [information] upon users indiscriminately"; view-
ers must start their computers, connect to Internet and find Web site to obtain
380 [Vol. 45: p. 353
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Commentators have criticized the application of the purposeful avail-
ment standard to Internet contacts.16 1 These commentators have sug-
gested a variety of alternative solutions including new tests,' 62 focusing on
the reasonableness prong of the traditional analysis, 163 legislative ac-
information); Lowther, supra note 11, at 649-50 (complaining that some courts do
not understand that Web sites are available everywhere and not just particular
states). But see Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1333 (E.D. Mo.
1996) (claiming that defendant chose to transmit information about its services
worldwide on Web site so exercise of personal jurisdiction was likely); Inset Sys.,
Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161, 164-65 (D. Conn. 1996) (deciding
that personal jurisdiction was proper because defendant maintained Web site ad-
vertisement that was available everywhere continuously including Connecticut);
State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., No. CIV.A.6-95-7227, 1996 WL 767431, *6
(Minn. Dist. Ct. Dec. 11, 1996) (exercising personal jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants who placed ad on Web site and stating that once defendants "place an
advertisement on the Internet, that advertisement is available 24 hours a day, seven
days a week, 365 days a year to any Internet user"), affd, 576 N.W.2d 747 (Minn.
1998).
161. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 156, at 606 ("Technological development of
the Internet effectively renders the concept of purposeful availment both concep-
tually incoherent and practically irrelevant."). According to Professor Redish, the
purposeful availment standard lacks a strong constitutional basis and ignores the
states' interest in protecting their citizens. See id. at 601. Professor Redish also
complains that the purposeful availment test is too hard to meet in Internet cases,
allowing nonresident defendants to cause a great deal of harm in forum states yet
escape personal jurisdiction. See id. Professor Redish argues that the Internet al-
lows defendants to cause harm in forum states "substantially more easily, quickly,
and pervasively than any prior form of communication." Id. at 604; see Lowther,
supra note 11, at 653-54 (concluding that traditional jurisdictional principles that
are based upon geography are too outdated for Internet).
162. See Redish, supra note 156, at 606-10 (recommending that courts focus
on forum state's interest in protecting its residents and procedural burdens on
defendant). The state's interest and procedural fairness factors would relate in-
versely. See id. at 609 (explaining test). If the state had a very strong interest in
exercising personal jurisdiction, then the defendant would have to show substan-
tial procedural burdens before the court would refuse to exercise personal jurisdic-
tion. See id. at 609. But if the forum had little interest in litigating the matter, then
the defendant could escape personal jurisdiction with a lesser showing of proce-
dural unfairness. See id. (noting result if forum had little interest in case).
163. See, e.g., Leonard Klingbaum, Note, Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King:
An Erroneous Application of Personal jurisdiction Law to Internet-Based Contacts (Using
the Reasonableness Test to Ensure Fair Assertions of Personal Jurisdiction Based on Cyber-
space Contacts), 19 PACE L. REv. 149, 188-94 (1998) (concluding that Internet does
not require new jurisdictional analysis but recommending that courts focus more
on reasonableness prong in deciding whether personal jurisdiction is proper).
One court has found the exercise of personal jurisdiction improper in an In-
ternet-based case because it did not comport with fair play and substantial justice.
See Expert Pages v. Buckalew, No. C-97-2109-VRW, 1997 WL 488011, *3-5 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 6, 1997) (refusing to exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident de-
fendant). In Buckalew, the defendant, a Virginia resident, had infringed upon the
plaintiff's copyrighted material. See id. at *2-3 (giving facts of case). Although the
district court concluded that the defendant had sufficient minimum contacts with
California, it refused to exercise personal jurisdiction because the defendant's
business was unsuccessful, he lived across the country and had not visited Califor-
nia in a long time. See id. at *4-5. The court concluded that forcing the defendant
to defend himself in California was an unacceptable burden. See id. (finding per-
29
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tion,' 6 4 a Supreme Court ruling 6 5 or rethinking the policies underlying
personal jurisdiction. 166 Some commentators, however, claim that there is
no need to adopt new personal jurisdiction principles for the Internet. 1 67
Certainly, Barrett illustrates the challenges in applying the purposeful avail-
ment test to online activities.1
68
2. District Court's Use of Effects Test Was Preferable
The district court's use of the effects test to analyze personal jurisdic-
tion on the Internet illustrates the benefits of that approach. 169 The ef-
fects test applies to the Internet better than the purposeful availment test
because it is based upon the harm a plaintiff actually suffers in the forum
state.1 70 As the Barrett court pointed out, the plaintiff could not show any
sonal jurisdiction would hurt defendant's opportunity to defend himself). One
commentator, however, found this decision questionable. See Leitstein, supra note
54, at 581 (believing that other courts would probably have found exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction reasonable).
164. See, e.g., Michelle R. Jackson-Carter, Comment, International Shoe and
Cyberspace: The Shoe Doesn't Fit When It Comes to the Intricacies and Nuances of
Cyberworld, 20 WHITTIER L. REv. 217, 238-240 (1998) (concluding that congres-
sional legislation is only way to alleviate courts' confusion in deciding Internet
jurisdiction cases). But see Lowther, supra note 11, at 654-55 (believing that federal
legislation would merely maintain unacceptable status quo and create federalism
concerns).
165. See Klingbaum, supra note 163, at 151-52 (speculating that Supreme
Court could end Internet personal jurisdiction confusion by establishing bright
line rule).
166. See Betensky, supra note 10, at 22 (recommending that legal community
reconsider policy of travel hardship underlying personal jurisdiction because today
there is much less hardship in traveling to different jurisdiction for litigation);
David Wille, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet-Proposed Limits on State Jurisdiction
over Data Communications in Tort Cases, 87 Ky. L.J. 95, 113 (1999) (advising end to
minimum contacts test and devising new personal jurisdiction analysis based upon
sovereignty of states).
167. See Stein, supra note 12, at 1179-91 (arguing that Internet cases can be
resolved under traditional personal jurisdiction framework); Stravitz, supra note
72, at 940-41 ("Because the Internet transcends geography, it is the ideal context
in which to finally discard the territorial ghost of Pennoyer, and focus jurisdictional
analysis squarely on whether a chosen forum will provide all parties with fair play
and substantial justice."); David G. Thomas, Note, Personal Jurisdiction in the Nebu-
lous Regions of Cyberspace: A Call for the Continued Relaxation of Due Process and Another
Debilitating Blow to Territorialfurisdiction, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 507, 530-34 (1997)
(recommending further expansion of personal jurisdiction principles to cover In-
ternet); Richard S. Zembek, Comment, Jurisdiction and the Internet: Fundamental
Fairness in the Networked World of Cyberspace, 6 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 339, 367-68
(1996) (believing that Internet cases can be resolved under traditional personal
jurisdiction principles).
168. For a further discussion of the challenges in applying the purposeful
availment standard to the Internet, see supra notes 154-66 and accompanying text.
169. For a further discussion of the advantages of the "effects test" analysis,
see infra notes 169-78 and accompanying text.
170. See, e.g., Leitstein, supra note 54, at 585-90 (applying modified "effects
test" to hypothetical cases involving personal jurisdiction on Internet). Under
Leitstein's test, a court would decide if personal jurisdiction was proper by looking
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particular injury that he suffered in Pennsylvania. 17 Furthermore, it is
easier to decide whether a defendant knew his or her online actions would
hurt the plaintiff in the forum state, than to decide whether the defendant
purposefully availed himself or herself of the benefit of acting in the fo-
rum through the Internet. 72 Because the Internet lacks a geographical
presence, courts have had difficulty determining whether nonresident de-
fendants purposefully availed themselves of acting in the forum. ' 73 A non-
resident defendant may cause the plaintiff great harm in the forum but
not purposefully avail himself or herself of the benefit of acting in the
forum. 17 4 But under the effects test, these defendants would be subject to
personal jurisdiction because they caused the plaintiffs injury in the forum
and knew that injury in the forum was likely. 175
In utilizing the effects test, the district court distinguished between
Internet activities directed at Pennsylvania and Internet activities directed
at the entire world. 176 Instead of simply reasoning that the defendant ac-
ted on the Internet, and therefore knew her activities were felt worldwide
(including in Pennsylvania), the district court tried to determine whether
these activities actually had an impact in Pennsylvania. 177 As the district
court pointed out, the defendant had attacked the plaintiff as a national
consumer advocate on nationally concerned Usenet groups and list-
at "(1) Whether the defendant committed a volitional act that; (2) [c]aused signifi-
cant harm; (3) [t]o an entity that the defendant knew or should have known would
be harmed by the activity, thus, making suit on the harmful result of that conduct
foreseeable." Id. at 585. Therefore, under this test, the defendant would probably
not be subject to personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania unless the plaintiff could
show that he suffered significant harm.
171. For a discussion of how much harm the plaintiff suffered in Penn-
sylvania, see supra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
172. For a further discussion of the advantages of the "effects test" as opposed
to the disadvantages of the purposeful availment standard, see supra notes 157-79
and accompanying text.
173. For a further discussion of the difficulties in deciding whether a defend-
ant has met the purposeful availment standard, see supra notes 129, 158 and ac-
companying text.
174. See Betensky, supra note 10, at 20 (worrying that defendant may create
passive, noncommercial Web site that does not trigger personal jurisdiction yet
causes plaintiff much harm in forum); Leitstein, supra note 54, at 585 ("On the
Internet, harm can be done by an entity without purposeful availment").
175. For a further discussion of the "effects test," see supra notes 72-76 and
accompanying text.
176. For a discussion of how the district court examined the defendant's on-
line activities, see supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
177. For a further discussion of the district court's analysis, see supra notes
146-50 and accompanying text.
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servs. 178 Furthermore, the plaintiff did not suffer a substantial amount of
harm in Pennsylvania.
1 79
3. Noncommercial Nature of Defendant's Online Activities
Finally, the district court acted in accordance with other courts in dis-
tinguishing the defendant's noncommercial activities from other commer-
cial Internet cases.' 80 Many courts and commentators have noted that
finding personal jurisdiction on the Internet is directly related to how
much business a defendant has conducted online. 18 1 Because the defend-
ant was not conducting business over the Internet, the district court was
correct in not holding her to the same standard as businesses using the
Internet.182
V. IMPACT
Barrett provides a useful framework for courts analyzing personal juris-
diction in noncommercial Internet cases.18 3 Because most previous cases
involving personal jurisdiction on the Internet were based upon commer-
cial activity, courts have had little precedent until Barrett for deciding non-
commercial Internet cases. 18 4 Since Barrett, at least one court has cited its
178. For a discussion of the defendant's activities on nationally concerned
Usenet groups and listservs, see supra notes 86, 129, 144-45 and accompanying
text.
179. For a further discussion of the lack of substantial harm that the plaintiff
suffered in Pennsylvania, see supra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
180. See Barrett v. Catacombs Press, 44 F. Supp. 2d 717, 728 (E.D. Pa. 1999)
("The non-commercial nature of Defendant's postings means that she is unlike the
commercial entrepreneurs in other Internet cases who have actively availed them-
selves of the privilege of conducting business in the forum state.").
181. See Cybersell, Inc., v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 418-19 (9th Cir. 1997)
(noting that courts look at how much commercial activity defendant has con-
ducted over Internet to establish personal jurisdiction); ESAB Group, Inc. v. Cen-
tricut, LLC, 34 F. Supp. 2d 323, 330-31 (D.S.C 1999) (stating that "nature and
quality of commercial activity actually conducted by [a defendant] over the In-
teret in the forum state" is most important factor); Edberg v. Neogen Corp., 17 F.
Supp. 2d 104, 114-15 (D. Conn. 1998) (refusing to exercise personal jurisdiction
over defendant because forum residents could not purchase products through de-
fendant's Web site); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119,
1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (finding personal jurisdiction on Internet is "directly propor-
tionate" to amount of commerce defendant conducts over Internet); Betensky,
supra note 10, at 12 (arguing that commercial nature of Web site is "huge factor"
and that courts harbor bias against exercising personal jurisdiction over noncom-
mercial Web sites).
182. See Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 728 (distinguishing defendant's noncom-
mercial activities from cases involving defendants conducting business activities
online).
183. For a further discussion of the Barrett court's analysis of personal jurisdic-
tion on the Internet, see infra notes 185-93 and accompanying text.
184. For a further discussion of commercial cases involving the Internet and
personal jurisdiction, see supra notes 47-76 and accompanying text.
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analysis approvingly and refused to exercise personal jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants accused of online defamation.
1 8 5
Exercising personal jurisdiction in this case could have jeopardized
the freedom of online discussion. 186 The Barrett court recognized this
danger and sought to avoid it by refusing to exercise personal jurisdic-
tion. 18 7 If the district court had exercised personal jurisdiction over the
defendant, it might have chilled free speech.1 88 As the district court em-
phasized, the defendant was not profiting from her allegedly defamatory
statements concerning the plaintiff.18 9 The defendant opposed the plain-
tiffs promotion of fluoridated water for highly personal reasons. 1 90 Even
185. See Blakey v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 730 A.2d 854, 866-67 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1999) (affirming lower court's dismissal of plaintiffs suit for lack of
personal jurisdiction). Like Barrett, this was a defamation case. See id. at 857 (stat-
ing that plaintiff sued defendants for defamation, sexual harassment, business libel
and emotional distress). The plaintiff, who resided in Washington but was based
in New Jersey, was a pilot for the defendant. See id. at 856-57. After the plaintiff
had filed a sexual harassment complaint against the defendant, several employees
of the defendant had written allegedly defamatory remarks about the plaintiff on
the defendant's computer system. See id. at 957-60. All but one of the defendants
who wrote these remarks did not reside in New Jersey. See id. at 860. The New
Jersey court refused to exercise personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defend-
ants because the plaintiff did not reside in New Jersey, the defendants' comments
did not target New Jersey and the plaintiff did not suffer "identifiable harm" in
New Jersey. See id. at 867.
186. See Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 731 (worrying that exercise of personal juris-
diction in this case "would result in hindering the wide range of discussion permis-
sible on listserves, USENET discussion groups and Web sites that are informational
in nature").
187. See id. (discussing possible effects of exercising personal jurisdiction).
188. See Lowther, supra note 11, at 652 (claiming that exercise of personal
jurisdiction based upon solicitation for commercial or noncommercial purposes
could threaten free speech and damage Internet as revolutionary communication
tool). But see Betensky, supra note 10, at 19 (noting that noncommercial passive
Web site can still cause great harm in forum and it would be unfair to force injured
plaintiff to prosecute outside forum); Wille, supra note 166, at 178-79 (rejecting
courts' and commentators' arguments that expansive exercise of personal jurisdic-
tion could threaten Internet). According to Wille, this argument assumes that
more participation on the Internet is good although there is already too much
useless information on the Internet. See id. at 178 (criticizing amount of useless
information on Internet). Wille also argues that these commentators and courts
assume that low-cost participation on the Internet is more important than punish-
ing people who use the Internet illegally. See id. at 179 (arguing that interest in
punishing wrongdoers should outweigh interest in encouraging Internet growth).
Finally, Wille says that even if the personal jurisdiction does damage the Internet,
Congress can step in and pass new laws on personal jurisdiction. See id.
189. See Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 728 (distinguishing defendant's Internet
activities from commercial Internet entrepreneurs).
190. See Darlene Sherrell, A Near Death Experience (visited Oct. 14, 1999)
<http://www.ia4u.net/-sherrell/near.htm> (discussing defendant's reasons for
opposing fluoridation). The defendant claims that she went into anaphylactic
shock and suffered life long effects after drinking fluoridated water. See id.
In this case, the defendant's allegedly defamatory statements were fairly tame
compared to other Internet defamation cases. Compare Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at
727, 730 (giving examples of defendant's defamatory statements where she at-
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in commercial Internet cases, courts have expressed concern about exer-
cising personal jurisdiction to the detriment of online activities.19 ' Assert-
ing personal jurisdiction based upon noncommercial comments could
have even more serious consequences, such as causing Internet users to
censor themselves or discouraging the creation of Web sites. 19 2 Fortu-
nately, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania avoided this result by refusing to exercise personal jurisdiction
over the defendant in Barrett.19 3
Katherine Neikirk
tacked plaintiff's credibility as consumer advocate), with Bochan v. La Fontaine,
No. CIV.A. 98-1749-A, 1999 WL 343780, *1 (E.D. Va. May 26, 1999) (noting that
defendants accused plaintiff of subscribing to Usenet groups involving child por-
nography and cannibalism). Unlike the Barrett court, the Bochan court found that
the defendants were subject to personal jurisdiction in Virginia. See Bochan, 1999
WL 343780, at *6. The defendants had business contacts with Virginia (two
through book sales and the other through Web site) and the plaintiff felt the ef-
fects of their actions in Virginia, where he lived and worked. See id. at *3-6. Addi-
tionally, the defendants knew the plaintiff lived in Virginia. See id. at *5.
191. See, e.g., ESAB Group, Inc., v. Centricut, LLC, 34 F. Supp. 2d 323, 330 n.4
(D.S.C. 1999) (recognizing that basing personal jurisdiction upon availability of
Web site in forum could lead to worldwide jurisdiction); Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Com-
puting, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 34, 39 (D. Mass. 1997) (holding that personal jurisdic-
tion was proper but recognizing that "imposing traditional concepts on
commercial Internet users might have dramatic implications, subjecting them to
nationwide or even international jurisdiction"); Digital Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista
Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 471 (D. Mass. 1997) (mentioning tension between
forcing online businesses to possibly litigate in every state and allowing these busi-
nesses to escape personal jurisdiction in every state except where they are physi-
cally located); Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 CIV.A. 3620, 1997 WL 97097, *1
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1997) (allowing Web site to establish personal jurisdiction could
subject site creator to "nationwide (indeed, worldwide) personal jurisdiction").
192. See Barrett, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 731 (fearing exercise of personal jurisdiction
over noncommercial online speech could hinder currently open Internet commu-
nication); ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (deciding that
"[a]s the most participatory form of mass speech yet developed, the Internet de-
serves the highest protection from governmental intrusion"), aff'd, 521 U.S. 844
(1997); STREET, supra note 157, at xxxv (hoping courts do not discourage "exciting
aspects of free expression on the Internet"); Lowther, supra note 11, at 652 (argu-
ing that exercising personal jurisdiction based upon Web page is dangerous be-
cause "the resultant chilling of speech on the internet could be detrimental to
what has been noted to be one of the greatest tools for rapid, precise, and lasting
human communication"); Shulman, supra note 159, at 807 (worrying that exercise
of personal jurisdiction based upon Web page could "limit Internet advertising
only to those enterprises that can afford to litigate matters in foreign and distant
jurisdictions").
193. For a further discussion of the negative consequences of asserting per-
sonal jurisdiction based upon noncommercial Internet contacts, see supra notes
186-92 and accompanying text.
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